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The onset of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis slowed economic 
growth in Brazil and threatened the country’s established trajec-
tory of decreasing poverty and inequality. To mitigate prolonged 
effects of the crisis, leadership implemented a growth-with-equity 
stimulus plan, of which investment in income augmentation and 
human capital-building programs for the poor were primary ele-
ments. This article examines the economic and social impacts of the 
stimulus package. It shows that stimulus measures had overall pos-
itive effects on the economy, but mixed effects on the well-being of 
the underprivileged. Improvements in the underprivileged popula-
tion’s well-being may be less profound than officials have reported, 
as gains on poverty have been assessed in terms of income level and 
social program utilization rates, while the low quality of human 
capital-building services has been less considered. If the quality of 
these services is not improved, human capital development may 
be stunted, which could hinder future socioeconomic progress.
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Throughout the first years of the new millennium, Brazil 
established an impressive track record of rigorous economic 
growth alongside a rapidly declining national poverty rate.
The onset of the 2007-2008 global economic crisis threatened 
these achievements (International Labor Organization, 2010; 
Serrano & Summa, 2011). The collapse of Lehman Brothers 
triggered a domino effect across the international banking 
system, choking credit to the private sector, driving investor 
and consumer uncertainty, and threatening the socioeconomic 
security of the public (Arestis & Karakitsos, 2012; Davies & 
McGregor, 2009). Immediately following the onset of the crisis, 
G20 countries coordinated a stimulus agenda in an attempt 
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to ward off prolonged recession (Cooper, 2010), but by 2010, 
several European and Global North states had reevaluated the 
financial burden of expansionary policy and switched their 
crisis management strategy to one of fiscal austerity (Salmon, 
2010; Wren-Lewis, 2011). Brazil, however, maintained a com-
mitment to stimulus measures to minimize social suffering 
and jumpstart economic activity. In 2009, Brazilian leadership 
implemented a growth-with-equity stimulus plan primarily 
aimed at increasing investment in the well-being of the poor 
(International Labor Organization, 2011). This policy was ex-
panded even further in the years following the crisis. As coun-
tries across Europe and the Global North continue to struggle 
with the economic and social repercussions of the financial 
crisis, Brazil has bounced back with reinstated growth and 
continued gains on poverty (Ministry of Finance, 2011). This 
recovery is impressive, yet the social and economic achieve-
ments are not without their limitations. 
This article explores the social and economic effects of 
Brazil’s recent stimulus agenda, with the well-being of the un-
derprivileged being the focal point of analysis. To begin, this 
article sets forth the two responses to economic crisis that lead-
ership may implement: fiscal austerity and stimulus spending. 
The article then examines Brazil’s stimulus plan and consid-
ers how policy measures impacted economic factors, namely 
employment and growth, and social variables, such as income 
level and human capital development. As the article suggests, 
stimulus measures have had mixed effects on underprivileged 
persons, which, if not addressed, may compromise future 
social and economic progress. Policy and advocacy implica-
tions are then considered. Finally, suggestions for social policy 
and future areas of research are recommended. 
Managing Economic Crisis: Two Perspectives
The onset of the global financial crisis sparked interna-
tional debate on how economies should recover from down-
turned growth, with economists grappling with the costs and 
benefits of the two available options: fiscal austerity or stimu-
lus spending (Tcherneva, 2012). With austerity programs, po-
litical leaders seek economic expansion through fiscal contrac-
tion, employing a series of spending cuts and tax increases to 
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reduce the budget deficit and manage debt (Stone & Cox, 2008; 
Tcherneva, 2012). Proponents of austerity argue that fiscal 
conservatism spurs private spending by calming uncertainty 
about federal debt and boosting confidence in federal fiscal 
management (Schoenbaum, 2012). Critics, however, argue that 
austerity fails to activate new economic growth, and inflicts 
massive human costs on the population (McKee, Karanikolos, 
Belcher, & Stuckler, 2012). Critics also claim that austerity ag-
gravates unemployment, drives civil unrest, and destabilizes 
society by cutting access to public programs, like social secu-
rity, unemployment benefits, and public education and health 
services. As critics further argue, trimming such programs dis-
proportionately affects the poor (United Nations Office of the 
High Commission for Human Rights, 2012).
Stimulus, on the other hand, combats recession by 
pumping money into the national economy, typically through 
a combination of government borrowing and tax cuts (Stone & 
Cox, 2008). Guided by the overall goal of spurring job creation 
by augmenting consumption demand (Davig & Leeper, 2009; 
Romer & Bernstein, 2009), stimulus plans typically introduce 
focused, short-term, timely programs, such as infrastructure 
development, investment in local economies, and support for 
the unemployed, the poor, and other socioeconomically vul-
nerable groups (Salmon, 2010). Opponents of stimulus mea-
sures argue that deficit spending can balloon to unsustainable 
levels over time, and may yield uncertain long-term gains on 
problems like unemployment (Schizer, 2012). Advocates for 
expansionary policy counter-argue that stimulated consump-
tion and demand encouraged by increased federal spending 
reestablish market engagement, curb job loss, and minimize 
social suffering (McKee et al., 2012). They also argue that once 
the economy recovers, employment and tax revenues will in-
crease, resulting in reduced need for public benefits and deficit 
spending (Stone & Cox, 2008).
Post-Crisis Stimulus Measures in Brazil
After experiencing economic downturn in late 2008, Brazil 
mitigated prolonged effects of the global financial crisis by 
implementing an equity-and-growth stimulus package in 2009 
(International Labor Organization, 2010). The rationale for 
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Brazil’s stimulus policy has deep political, historical, and social 
roots. After enduring two decades of dire socioeconomic in-
stability characterized by massive unemployment, hyperinfla-
tion, fluctuating output, and extreme destitution and inequal-
ity, stabilization efforts introduced in the late-1990s paved the 
way for Brazil’s new economic path. By the early 2000s, this 
path consisted of robust economic growth alongside rapidly 
decreasing poverty and inequality (Paiva, 2009).. From 2004 
to 2007, Brazil’s annual growth averaged 4.4% in real terms 
(International Labor Organization, 2010), more than double its 
annual growth from 1999 to 2003 (Serrano & Summa, 2011). 
The national poverty rate1 fell from 35.3% of the population in 
1999 to 33.7% in 2004, speeding up to drop to 21.4% by 2009 
(United Nations, 2013). 
Recent economic growth is primarily due to an early-2000s 
boom in Brazilian exports and subsequent development of 
domestic markets (Kandil & Morsy, 2010). Brazil’s export-
led growth began to cool in the middle of the decade, due to 
declining international demand with the onset of the global 
crisis. However, expansionary monetary policy bolstered bur-
geoning internal markets and established the spending trajec-
tory on which post-crisis stimulus measures would be built 
(Serrano & Summa, 2011). The recent rapid decline in poverty 
that accompanied economic growth is primarily attributed to 
the 2003 introduction of the flagship social assistance program, 
Bolsa Família (“Family Grant”), a conditional cash transfer 
program. While Bolsa Família’s achievements have been note-
worthy, millions of Brazilians continue to live in poverty, with 
over 16 million of the country’s 190 million people residing 
in extreme poverty2 today (Ministry of Social Development, 
2012). This has only fueled the rationale for increased social 
spending.
When the 2008 global crisis hit, the international 
credit crunch and environment of uncertainty that rippled 
global markets also threatened Brazil (International Labor 
Organization, 2010; Williamson, 2009). To mitigate rever-
sion of socioeconomic gains achieved over the last decade, 
Brazil introduced a “growth-cum-equity” stimulus package 
that totaled US $20 billion, or just over 1% of the national 
GDP (International Labor Organization, 2010). The multi-
faceted package included spending on infrastructure (41.5% 
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of package budget), tax cuts (35%), subsidies (15%), transfers 
to municipalities (5.5%), and investment in social protection 
programs (International Labor Organization, 2010). This latter 
component included an expansion of Bolsa Família (1.5% of the 
package budget), an extension of unemployment insurance for 
up to two months (1%), and the introduction of the Minha Casa, 
Minha Vida (“My House, My Life”) public housing plan, a com-
ponent of the infrastructure investment initiative (International 
Labor Organization, 2010). Since the 2009 stimulus package 
was introduced, subsequent anti-poverty measures have been 
implemented, most notably Brasil Sem Miséria (“Brazil Without 
Misery”), a comprehensive program that targets people living 
in extreme poverty. 
Impact of Stimulus Measures on the Economy 
Brazil’s pre-crisis economic environment was character-
ized by a decade of booming domestic growth, an agenda of 
coherent macroeconomic policies based on monetary stabil-
ity and fiscal equilibrium, and a restructured financial system 
carried over from stabilization reforms of the late 1990s (Paiva, 
2009). This structure alleviated the blow of the financial crisis 
and set the stage for stimulus measures to deliver quick eco-
nomic recovery (Paiva, 2009). After only two quarters of nega-
tive growth, Brazil’s GDP growth pivoted towards the posi-
tive by late 2009, registering at 4.4% by the final quarter of that 
year (International Labor Organization, 2011). Had the stim-
ulus package not been introduced, the government believes 
that GDP would have contracted by 2% (International Labor 
Organization, 2010). By 2010, 2.2 million new formal sector jobs 
had been created (a 6.7% increase), and prolonged expansion 
of the informal labor market had been avoided (International 
Labor Organization, 2011). Domestic markets, particularly in 
the service sector, developed further, supported by credit sup-
plied by the three public banks at a time when private banks 
were hesitant to lend (Ocampo, 2012). Additionally, low- and 
middle-income families’ purchasing power was increased by a 
reduction in taxes and, for some, by income supplementation 
vis-à-vis Bolsa Família cash transfers (Barbosa, 2012). 
The stimulus package’s social programs contributed to eco-
nomic rejuvenation in various ways. Overall, Bolsa Família cash 
transfers injected US $30 billion into the national economy, and 
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had multiplier effects of 1.4 on GDP and 2.2 on family incomes 
(International Labor Organization, 2011). Furthermore, cov-
erage and targeting expansions of the flagship social welfare 
program is estimated to have created and saved a total of 1.3 
million jobs (International Labor Organization, 2011). As a 
result of the public housing program Minha Casa, Minha Vida, 
1 million homes for low- and middle-income families were 
built by 2010, with another 2 million scheduled for construc-
tion by the end of 2015 (World Bank, 2012). As of 2012, Minha 
Casa, Minha Vida had created 1.4 million jobs in the construc-
tion sector, an industry that had been negatively impacted by 
the financial crisis (Ministry of Development, Industry, and 
Foreign Trade, 2013).
Brazil has fared well in comparison to other countries 
hit by the global recession, including those that adopted an 
agenda of fiscal austerity. Recession continues to burden the 
Iberian states of Spain and Portugal, for example, where both 
private and public demand remain depressed (Koumparoulis 
& Wong, 2012). Spending on human development services 
has been dramatically reduced in that region, as exempli-
fied by Spain’s education budget, which has been slashed by 
20% (Burridge, 2012). Such cuts have driven social backlash 
and unrest (Hughes, 2011). Unemployment of youth under 25 
years of age registers at 55% in Spain, and the persistent down-
turned labor market across the Iberian Peninsula has driven 
youth and professionals to migrate in search of work to now-
booming former Latin American colonies, including Brazil 
(MacSwan, 2012; “With Youth,” 2013). While Brazil’s post-cri-
sis environment is remarkably different from that of its Iberian 
counterparts, it is important to note that Brazil’s position as 
an “emerging economy”—characterized by a half-decade of 
vibrant internal growth, booming international market activ-
ity, and recently reformed financial structures—helped drive 
its prompt recovery (Paiva, 2009). 
In the years following the economic crisis, Brazilian growth 
continued, albeit at a slower pace than anticipated (Ministry of 
Finance, 2011). Investment in transportation and other infra-
structure has been amplified, and spending on social programs 
has been further augmented, which has helped keep unem-
ployment low (5.3% in 2012) and consumption high (Winter 
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& Pereira, 2012). The massive expansion of credit in domestic 
markets has expanded economic participation to new members 
of society and supported local business growth.However, reli-
ance on credit has also introduced vulnerabilities, and many 
consumers have reached their debt limits (International 
Monetary Fund, 2012). 
Increased spending has sparked debate. Some question 
whether the state can sustain growth alongside fiscal injections 
(Winter & Pereira, 2012). Nevertheless, the Brazilian Ministry of 
Finance (2011) projects that the economy will maintain healthy 
performance going forward, displaying positive growth, sus-
tained domestic demand, and positive consumer and industry 
confidence.
Impact of Stimulus Measures on Social Well-being 
While the 2009 stimulus package had an overall positive 
impact on the economy, the measures had mixed effects on 
the social well-being of the underprivileged. To begin, ex-
tended employment insurance had little to no impact on the 
economic security of the poor. The insurance initiative offered 
support to 310,000 workers in key downturned industries, like 
mining and steelmaking (International Labor Organization, 
2010). However, the program targeted the formal sector, an 
area in which poor people in Brazil typically do not work 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2011; World Bank, 1995). Thus, few, if any, poor people directly 
benefitted from the extended insurance measure.
The public housing program, Minha Casa, Minha Vida, 
however, did have direct benefits on the underprivileged. 
Funded by a blend of government and private investment, 
Minha Casa, Minha Vida assisted over 1 million low-income 
Brazilians in obtaining housing, either as renters or mort-
gaged buyers (World Bank, 2012). By moving into Minha Casa, 
Minha Vida housing complexes, many families received access 
to basic human and sanitation services for the first time, such 
as sewage systems, treated water, and electric power (Santin, 
2012). Furthermore, individuals with special needs, such as the 
elderly and wheelchair users, were provided housing that ac-
commodates their lifestyles and needs, which many did not 
have in their previous accommodations (Santin, 2012). After 
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the 2009 stimulus package was introduced, a second wave 
of Minha Casa, Minha Vida investment was unveiled in 2011, 
with the federal government dedicating R$140 billion reais 
(US $70 billion) to program expansion (Maresch, 2011). As a 
part of this second wave of investment, two socially progres-
sive initiatives were introduced to the housing program: first, 
women no longer need their husband’s signatures to enroll, 
and second, all homes were designed to be powered with solar 
energy panels (Maresch, 2011).
While Minha Casa, Minha Vida has provided numerous un-
derprivileged Brazilians with access to adequate housing, the 
program is not a total success story. Many residents state that 
the complexes are being built in the distant periphery without 
adequate access to health facilities, schools, or public trans-
portation (Duarte & Benevides, 2013; Santin, 2012). In met-
ropolitan areas, where onerous commutes are commonplace, 
housing complex isolation is particularly burdensome. In Rio 
de Janeiro, for example, the average walk from Minha Casa, 
Minha Vida complexes to bus and metro stops is approximately 
thirty minutes, and many residents must take multiple modes 
of transportation to access the city center and places of em-
ployment (Duarte & Benevides, 2013). This imposes high costs 
and travel time on commuting residents. 
Economic motivations may be at the heart of these burdens, 
as economic planning commissions within the government, 
rather than local participatory coalitions, established the pro-
gram’s real estate development plans (Valença & Bonates, 
2009). Furthermore, contractors and investors are arguably 
more likely to develop complexes in the distant periphery 
because land purchased for construction is less expensive in 
this area, thus yields higher profits for builders and investors 
(Duarte & Benevides, 2013). 
Among all other social measures introduced with the 
2009 stimulus package, the principal welfare investment was 
the expansion of Brazil’s principle anti-poverty program, 
Bolsa Família. Bolsa Família is a means-tested, targeted, condi-
tional cash transfer program that provides underprivileged 
families with monthly cash benefits in exchange for meeting 
education and health “conditionalities,” which aim to 
build human capital (Lindert, 2006; Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, 
& de la Brière, 2007). Conditionalities require that every 
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school-age child between the ages of 7 and 17 years must be 
enrolled in school and attend 85% of monthly school hours, 
and that mothers and children under 7 years of age complete 
an agenda of pre-natal care, vaccinations, and health and nu-
trition surveillance (Santos, Paes-Sousa, Miazagi, Silva, & 
Medeiros da Fonseca, 2011).
The 2009 expansion of Bolsa Família was delivered in two 
ways. First, the targeted beneficiary pool was broadened, 
and second, cash benefit amounts were increased (Fiszbein, 
Ringold, & Srinivasan, 2011; Soares, Ribas, & Soares, 2010). The 
qualifying income level was raised, which added 1.3 million 
families to the previous target population of 11 million fami-
lies, and the amounts of fixed and variable per-child stipends 
were increased, only to be raised again in 2011 (Soares, 2012). 
As a final 2009 stimulus measure, new local-level poverty esti-
mation methods were implemented, which allowed for a more 
accurate determination of the number of eligible families, and 
increased participation of beneficiaries in previously excluded 
areas (Fiszbein et al., 2011).
While the 2009 increase in Bolsa Família accounted for only 
1.5% of the total stimulus budget, the cumulative gains that the 
program has had on inequality and poverty alleviation since 
2003 are significant (International Labor Organization, 2011). 
Today, Bolsa Família is the largest conditional cash program in 
the world. It extends benefits to 25% of the Brazilian popula-
tion—almost 13 million families, or about 52 million people 
(Santos et al., 2011). There is evidence that Bolsa Família income 
augmentation has led to various improvements in beneficia-
ries’ well-being, such as increased food security (Rocha, 2009), 
healthier diets (Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations, 2006), and investment in basic necessities, such 
as clothing, medicine, and school supplies (O Futuro Começa 
Agora, 2012). Official sources emphasize that Bolsa Família has 
“lifted” millions of families out of poverty (i.e., above the na-
tional poverty line) (Ministry of Social Development, 2013). 
However, some independent program evaluators suggest that 
the program is more successful in closing the income distribu-
tion gap, rather than in relieving poverty (e.g., Soares & Sátyro, 
2010). Others argue that while achievements are significant, 
due to means testing, the program excludes people residing 
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just above the poverty line who may also be socioeconomically 
insecure (Soares, Ribas, & Soares, 2010). Hence, because Bolsa 
Família enforces a qualifying income limit, it may keep vulner-
able individuals from receiving the services they need.    
Evaluations of human capital building initiatives in educa-
tion and health have yielded varied results. In terms of health, 
Bolsa Família enhances public awareness about health services 
(Soares, Ribas, & Osório, 2010), and increases the likelihood 
that pregnant mothers will attend prenatal care visits and chil-
dren will be vaccinated (Gilligan & Fruttero, 2011; Ministry of 
Social Development, 2007). However, some beneficiaries claim 
that low-quality clinics, staff, and services prevent their access 
to equitable healthcare (Ministry of Social Development, 
2007). In terms of education, Bolsa Família clearly encourages 
attendance and re-enrollment, and discourages dropping out 
(Gilligan & Fruttero, 2011; Glewwe & Kassouf, 2012; Ministry 
of Social Development, 2007). However, the program may 
fall short of improving children’s performance in school, and 
even when children consistently attend classes, the program 
appears to have little impact on their cognitive skill develop-
ment (Santarrosa, 2011; Soares, Ribas, & Osório, 2010). These 
results are at least in part due to the low quality of curricula, 
schools, and some teachers (Santarrosa, 2011; Soares, Ribas, & 
Osório, 2010). 
As these various studies suggest, Bolsa Família succeeds 
at increasing enrollment rates and the number of people with 
access to social services, but fails to address the quality of servic-
es (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2011), which, especially for education, is very low across Brazil 
(Aquino Menezes-Filho, Franco, & Waltenberg, 2008). This 
matter is of concern, as even when conditional cash transfer 
programs impose a mandatory use of health and education 
services, complying with program conditionalities may not 
build human capital if the quality of those services is not taken 
into account (Calvo, 2011). 
Two years after the implementation of the 2009 stimulus 
package, anti-poverty spending increased even more with 
the 2011 introduction of Brasil Sem Miséria, a multi-initiative 
program that targets people living in extreme poverty (Ministry 
of Social Development, 2012). This program scaled up Bolsa 
Família by taking into account both income-based and various 
non-monetary dimensions of poverty that affect the extremely 
poor. Operating on an annual budget of R$20 billion, Brasil 
Sem Miséria offers expanded income assistance, enhanced 
skill-building initiatives (e.g., job training programs, particu-
larly for technical positions in the formal sector, and access to 
micro-credit), and improved public services (e.g., distribution 
of clean drinking water, and the addition of health center loca-
tions and improved services, particularly for children ages 0 to 
5) (Ministry of Social Development, 2012; Nehring & McKay, 
2013; Plan Brasil Sem Miseria, 2012). 
Brasil Sem Miséria also seeks to extend efforts of social 
inclusion to the extremely poor. The program employs lan-
guage of inclusion, clearly stating that it is vulnerable citizens’ 
“right” to obtain benefits and secure a better quality of life 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2012). Additionally, Brasil 
Sem Miséria implemented the Busca Ativa (“Active Search”) 
initiative, which sends teams of professionals, psychologists, 
social workers, and counselors to locate potential beneficiaries 
who have been excluded from benefit receipt for reasons such 
as living in remote areas and lack of documentation (Ministry 
of Social Development, 2012). 
According to Brazil’s Ministry of Social Development 
(2012), Brasil Sem Miséria achieved many successes after just 
one year of implementation. The population of qualified cash 
transfer beneficiaries was expanded to include women who 
are pregnant or breastfeeding, adding 255,000 mothers to the 
beneficiary roster. Across the country, 123,000 people were en-
rolled in technical job training courses. Of these students, 70% 
were women and 44% were young adults between the ages of 
18 to 28. Busca Ativa located 687,000 new families who were 
eligible for social plans, and set a new goal of reaching 800,000 
families by the end of 2013. Most impressively, Brasil Sem 
Miséria has “lifted” 22 million people out of extreme poverty 
since 2011 (Ministry of Social Development, 2013).
Despite these promising results, various concerns have 
surfaced. First, Brasil Sem Miséria carries over problems with 
exclusion due to income. To qualify for program benefits, 
people must be at or below the extreme poverty line, which 
may exclude some vulnerable persons from receiving benefits 
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that they may need. Second, much like Bolsa Família, Brasil 
Sem Miséria’s successes have been quantified in terms of en-
rollment. Granted Brasil Sem Miséria is in its infancy, thus it 
may be too soon to determine factors such as program quality 
and effectiveness. Going forward, such dimensions must be 
examined. Third, although Brasil Sem Miséria addresses the 
quality of health services, it does not tackle the quality of edu-
cation. Brasil Sem Miséria does include education initiatives in 
its agenda, such as Mais Educação (“More Education”), which 
supports optional activities, such as students attending full-
time school days rather than the norm of part-time shifts. This 
initiative, however, neglects to address contextual problems 
within the education system that shape learning, such as poor-
quality curricula, teachers, and facilities. 
Implications and Conclusions
Post-financial crisis stimulus spending in Brazil has had 
an overall positive impact on the economy but mixed effects 
on the well-being of the underprivileged. Emergency unem-
ployment insurance essentially bypassed the poor. Minha Casa, 
Minha Vida housing program created jobs and provided shelter 
to over 1 million people, but imposed new burdens on some 
recipients, like peripheral relocation. Bolsa Família extended 
financial assistance to over 1 million new beneficiaries and in-
creased access to education and health services. However, the 
effect of increased access and enrollment is inconclusive, given 
the low quality of services that beneficiaries tend to receive. 
Some underprivileged persons residing just above the qualify-
ing income threshold have been excluded from program ben-
efits altogether. Brasil Sem Miséria evolved the understanding 
of poverty to include various non-monetary factors, like clean 
water access and job training, and made efforts to improve 
health services. Brasil Sem Miséria, however, reaffirms access to 
social assistance based on income levels, and has yet to tackle 
the many complexities associated with improving the quality 
of education services—a pressing matter if human capital is to 
be built. 
Brazil’s social program successes have typically been con-
ceptualized in terms of quantitative increases—augmented 
income levels, an increased number of people with housing, 
138    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
a rise in school and clinic attendance rates. The extension of 
access to services is no doubt a massive accomplishment and 
a critical starting point. However, the celebration of these in-
dicators alone allows the low quality of services and the nega-
tive externalities that social programs may impose to be over-
looked. These disregarded factors must be acknowledged, 
as they impact the underprivileged population’s well-being, 
human capital development, and access to future opportuni-
ties—variables that are central to future social and economic 
progress. 
Two implications can be drawn from this analysis. First, 
despite Brazil’s pattern of healthy growth, future economic 
development may be stunted if the quality of human capital 
building mechanisms (primarily education) is not improved. A 
nation’s long-term international competitiveness is in part de-
termined by the quality of its labor force, which is largely con-
tingent upon the quality of its schools (Puryear & Goodspeed, 
2008). Furthermore, high-quality education “improves 
workers’ skills, promotes growth, [and] reduces poverty” 
(Puryear & Goodspeed, 2008, p. 45). Given these claims, the 
state of the Brazilian education system is alarming. Across the 
country, only 33% of fifth graders and 12% of ninth graders 
perform at the minimum competency level in mathematics, 
and 37% and 22% of the same age groups at the minimum 
level of Portuguese (QEdu, 2013). Children often repeat grade 
levels, and rather than attending a full day of classes, typi-
cally frequent one of two or three shifts, which are only a few 
hours long (“Brazil’s Poor,” 2009). There is a massive dearth of 
qualified teachers, and teacher truancy is a regular occurrence, 
with absence rates averaging 30% per academic year (“Brazil’s 
Poor,” 2009). Given that it may take years for changes in edu-
cation quality to yield returns (Morley, 2001), social policies 
that improve the quality of education are imperative today. 
Going forward, future research must critically assess factors 
that determine education quality, such as curricula, teacher 
qualifications, and facilities. Advocacy leaders and members 
of civil society must lobby for these changes to be implement-
ed in underprivileged schools. Furthermore, future policy 
agendas should focus on implementing policies that improve 
not just attendance rates, but also the quality of learning.
The second implication that can be drawn is that if negative 
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externalities of social programs are not addressed, they may 
negate the benefits of social services distributed to some un-
derprivileged persons. As illustrated by peripheral relocation 
with Minha Casa, Minha Vida, disconnects between objectives 
of economic growth and improved well-being may arise even 
within progressive development programs. There is a need for 
members of civil society to advocate for the state’s recognition 
of the negative externalities that programs may impose, and to 
lobby for correction of these burdens. There is also a need for 
research to explore the positive and negative impacts of this 
and other social programs, which will help identify program 
gaps that may be overshadowed by impressive enrollment and 
utilization rates. To date, few scholars have analyzed Minha 
Casa, Minha Vida and Brasil Sem Miséria. This may be due to the 
youth of these programs. Going forward, research exploring 
these programs in greater depth is needed.  
Overall, Brazil fared well in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis. Due to the 2009 stimulus package and 
subsequent spending initiatives, economic growth was main-
tained, jobs were created, and poverty continued to decline. 
Stimulus spending has had mixed effects on the well-being of 
the underprivileged primarily because the quality of distrib-
uted services and goods has been overlooked. If established 
socioeconomic successes are to be sustained, attention must 
be turned towards improving the quality of human capital 
building services for all members of society, including the 
underprivileged. 
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Endnotes:
1. The poverty rate is defined as the percentage of the population 
earning a per capita monthly income at or below the national 
poverty line (United Nations, 2013). In 2004, the poverty line 
registered at R$100 (US$50) and was adjusted various times, 
registering at R$140 (US$70) in 2011 (Soares, 2012).
2. Extreme poverty is defined as living at or below a per capita 
family income level, which in 2011 was R$70 (US$35) per month 
(Soares, 2012).

